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Thus, the supreme court in the instant case has correctly limited
municipal powers to the extent necessary to protect the state's policy of
punishing as "gambling" only such conduct as constitutes commercial
gambling. This is a sound policy because it may be unfair to punish a
citizen for engaging in conduct which the legislature has seen fit not to
prohibit. Furthermore, the result does not greatly impinge upon local
governmental police power since municipalities may still enact gambling
ordinances which are consistent with Criminal Code article 90. The de-
cision in the instant case therefore promotes state policy without greatly
burdening municipal powers, a "balanced" result which certainly ap-
pears consistent with the new philosophy of municipal powers under ar-
ticle VI of the 1974 constitution.
James Joseph Sullivan
BRINGING ORDER TO A DISORDERLY PLACE
Defendant was indicted for keeping a disorderly place I when police
investigation indicated that his two lounges in Bossier City were habitu-
ally used for an "immoral sexual purpose." The investigation stemmed
from allegations that the normal course of events in these lounges in-
cluded "B-drinking and lewd dancing."' 2 The Louisiana Supreme Court
held Criminal Code article 104, forbidding the "intentional maintaining
of a place to be habitually used. . . for any immoral sexual purpose,"
3
to be unconstitutionally vague. State v. Defrances, 351 So. 2d 133 (La.
1977).
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment as guaranteeing individuals the
right "to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."'4 Due
process requires that statutory language be sufficiently definite to give a
person of ordinary intelligence "fair warning" of what is prohibited, "so
1. LA. R.S. 14:104 (1950) provides in part: "Keeping a disorderly place is the inten-
tional maintaining of a place to be used habitually for any illegal purpose or for any im-
moral sexual purpose."
2. State v. Defrances, 351 So. 2d 133, 134 (La. 1977).
3. LA. R.S. 14:104 (1950); See note 1, supra, for the text of this section.
4. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
5. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953); American Communications
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that he may act accordingly."'6 When a statute is so vague that men of
common intelligence "guess"'7 at or "speculate" 8 about its meaning and
"differ as to its application," any penalty for its violation deprives them
of liberty or property without due process of law.' 0
In addition to alerting people to prohibited conduct, a precise stat-
ute does not force individuals to abstain from lawful activities which lie
on "the boundaries of the forbidden areas"" I out of fear of arrest. 12 De-
finitive laws also discourage the arbitrary and capricious use of the pow-
ers of enforcement and application by providing clear guidelines within
which these powers must be exercised.' 3
However, the protections provided by exact language are limited by
their underlying fabric, the words themselves. Few words are precise
enough to deal with the virtually countless variations in factual situa-
tions which may arise, 14 and consequently "no more than a reasonable
degree of certainty can be demanded."' 5 A statute will be upheld as
long as the words or phrases have a well known or commonly under-
stood meaning, '6 even though they might not precisely define the bound-
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413 (1949). The Supreme Court in United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875), stated that "it would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could
set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside
and say who could be rightfully detained and should be set at large."
6. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
7. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
8. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
9. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
10. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1964). The Court noted
that "[i]t is not the penalty itself that is invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a rule or
standard that is so vague and indefinite as to be really no rule or standard at all." Id. at
243. Accord, Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451 (1939). The void for vagueness doctrine originated in the era of substantive due proc-
ess involving economic control legislation. See Note, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 74 n.38 (1960).
11. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
12. See Force, Decriminalization of Breach of the Peace Statute A Nonpenal Approach
to Order Maintenance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 367, 431 (1972).
13. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Accord, Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 568 (1964) ("on-the-spot administrative interpretation by officials charged with
responsibility for administering and enforcing" a state criminal statute held impermissible).
14. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1949). The Court
said: "There is little doubt that imagination can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the
meaning of these terms will be in nice question." Id. at 412.
15. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1951).
16. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1953).
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aries of statutory coverage. 17
Conceptually similar, but arising from different sources, is Louisi-
ana's guarantee that penal statutes provide the public with a "reasonably
clear standard"' 8 of prohibited conduct. The Louisiana Constitution
has its own due process clause,19 but longstanding jurisprudence has uti-
lized a specific indictment requirement 20 as the basis for Louisiana's
"void for vagueness" doctrine2'-a doctrine which "permeates [Louisi-
ana's] system of criminal justice."'22 In applying the doctrine, Louisiana
courts are admonished by article 3 of the Criminal Code to give criminal
provisions "a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their
words, in their usual sense." 23 The statute also requires that words be
taken in connection with the context and with reference to the purpose of
the provision.24
These rules of interpretation are helpful in discovering a well known
meaning in nearly all cases. When the application of interpretive rules
fails to find a word's commonly understood meaning, the law which con-
tains the word will be held unconstitutionally vague. This problem par-
ticularly haunts the area of sex offenses and offenses affecting public
morals. To illustrate, the Louisiana Supreme Court has found unconsti-
tutionally vague the phrases "vulgar," 25 "immoral purpose,"' 26 "indecent
assaults," 27 "indecent prints," 28 and "lewd or indecent act." 29
17. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968).
18. State v. Robertson, 241 La. 249, 258, 128 So. 2d 646, 649 (1961) (construing La.
Const. art. I, § 10 (1921)).
19. LA. CoNsT. art. I, § 2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
except by due process of law."
20. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 13. This section is identical to a provision in the 1921 consti-
tution guaranteeing that "in a criminal prosecution, an accused shall be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him." La. Coast. art I, § 10 (1921).
21. In Stale v. Lindsey, 310 So. 2d 89 (La. 1975), the Louisiana Supreme Court said:
As developed by this court, this guarantee requires that penal statutes describe the
unlawful conduct with sufficient particularity and clarity such that ordinary men of
reasonable intelligence are capable of discerning its meaning and conforming their
conduct thereto.
Id. at 90. Accord, State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 37 So. 2d 815 (1948); State v. Truby, 211 La.
178, 29 So. 2d 758 (1947).
22. State v. Robertson, 241 La. 249, 258, 128 So. 2d 646, 649 (1961).
23. LA. R.S. 14:3 (1950).
24. Id.
25. State v. Hertzog, 241 La. 783, 131 So. 2d 788 (1961).
26. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So. 2d 758 (1947). "Immoral act" was held uncon-
stitutionally vague using the same reasoning employed in Truby. State v. Vallery, 212 La.
1095, 34 So. 2d 329 (1948).
27. State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930, 60 So. 620 (1913).
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To avoid using " '[c]umbersome enumeration or explicit delineation
of all possible situations,' ",30 and still meet the "fair notice" require-
ment, the legislature has successfully employed the rule noscitur a sociis
("It is known from its associates" 31). State v. Rose32 illustrates the
court's application of the rule. In Rose, the Louisiana Supreme Court
found the exact meaning of a word not "in the abstract,. . . but in the
context or combination of words." 33 In interpreting the phrase "lewd
dancing," the court admitted that" 'lewd' has no statutory definition, nor
technical meaning," 34 but said that when applied to dancing, it acquired
a "very well and generally understood and unmistakable meaning."' 35
In essence, the court restricted the meaning of the unclear "lewd" by
associating it with the specific "dancing," to make the phrase "lewd
dancing" unobjectionable.
The import of Rose was to give the legislature the option of adding
specific words to a statute which had been declared unconstitutionally
vague instead of replacing the vague words. One of the words the legis-
lature chose to use was "sexual." When "indecent," 36 "immoral act,"
37
and "immoral purpose"38 were declared unconstitutionally vague, the
legislature added "sexual" or "sexually" in an attempt to give the provi-
sions a well understood meaning. 39 State v. Roth4° and State v.
Fulmer4 ' subsequently held that the terms "sexually indecent" and "sex-
ually immoral act" had "an accepted meaning that [was] not susceptible
to misunderstanding. '"42
In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court was presented
with the opportunity to reconsider the Roth and Fulmer decisions when
28. State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 37 So. 2d 815 (1948).
29. City of Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906, 83 So. 186 (1919). Adding to the phrase
"lewd or indecent act" the qualifying words "grossly scandalous and tending to debauch
the morals and manners of the people" failed to add sufficient particularity to withstand a
vagueness challenge. State v. Christine, 239 La. 259, 118 So. 2d 403 (1959).
30. State v. Heck, 307 So. 2d 332, 334 (La. 1975), quotingfrom City of Baton Rouge v.
Norman, 290 So. 2d 865, 868 (La. 1974).
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
32. 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643 (1920).
33. Id. at 251, 84 So. at 646.
34. Id.
35. Id. ("indecent, lascivious, lecherous, tending to excite lustful thoughts").
36. State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930, 60 So. 620 (1913).
37. State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So. 2d 329 (1948).
38. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So. 2d 758 (1947).
39. 1950 La'. Acts, No. 314; 1948 La. Acts, Nos. 388, 389.
40. 226 La. 1, 74 So. 2d 392 (1954).
41. 250 La. 29, 193 So. 2d 774 (1967).
42. State v. Roth, 226 La. 1, 6, 74 So. 2d 392, 393 (1954).
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it scrutinized the meaning of "immoral sexual purpose." In declaring
the phrase unconstitutionally vague, the court found "no generally ac-
cepted meaning such that a person of ordinary intelligence would be
given fair notice of what conduct is forbidden. '43 The court reasoned
that the addition of the term "sexual" had not "sufficiently delimited the
word 'immoral' so as to pass constitutional muster."44 It would become
necessary "for the courts to decide what acts should be deemed to consti-
tute the offense, a function more properly belonging to the legislature. 45
The effect of the passage of time on a determination of whether
words provide sufficient "fair notice" played a significant role in the
Defrances decision; archaic phrases may acquire accepted legal mean-
ing46 while others lose the clarity they once had. In finding that the
phrase had become vague the court said, "[W]hat may have been consid-
ered to fall clearly within the scope of sexually immoral conduct [twenty-
nine years earlier when the statute was amended] may no longer be inter-
preted as such by a substantial segment of the population. '47 The words
are the same, but "the passage of time, and the increasingly more liberal
sexual standards"4 8 make "achieving a consensus of meaning .. .ex-
ceedingly more difficult."
49
Writing for the majority, Justice Dixon noted that the danger of us-
ing outdated language "lies in the potential of this language encompass-
ing certain activity that most would agree is generally not considered to
constitute criminal activity."5° The court illustrated its concern by cit-
ing socially permitted conduct that is common in modem life,5 1 but
43. State v. Defrances, 351 So. 2d at 135.
44. Id. The court examined WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.
unabridged 1953) to find the accepted meaning of "sexual." The dictionary definition
injected even more uncertainty. "Sexual" is defined as:
1. Pertaining to or associated with sex; as sexualdifferentiation; specif.: pertaining to
sex as concerned in reproductive processes; as, the sexual instinct or impulse.
2. Pertaining to the sexes; particular to, or relating to, either the male or female or
their distinctive organs or functions.
3. Pertaining to the use or abuse of sex functions, appetites, etc.; as, sexual morality.
4. Biol Having sex;--opposed to asexual.
351 So. 2d at 135 n.1.
45. 351 So. 2d at 135 n.L
46. State v. Lindsey, 310 So. 2d 89, 92 (La. 1975).
47. 351 So. 2d at 135.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 136.
50. Id.
51. Id. As examples, the court said:
[T]he owners of certain establishments are not informed by 14:104's language as to
whether the following activity is prohibited: (1) owners of 'swinging singles' apartment
19781
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which "some law enforcement personnel could construe ... as 'sexually
immoral.'"52 This result "could hardly have been what the legislature
had in mind when it was aiming to control the proliferation of bawdy
houses." 53
The court distinguished Defrances from its earlier decisions which
found a "generally accepted meaning" in the terms "sexually indecent" 54
and "sexually immoral act." 55 However, this may not have been neces-
sary in view of the court's belief that the "invalidity of [State v.] Roth
[which upheld "sexually indecent"] was clear after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. California [413 U.S. 15 (1973)]."56
The same reasoning can be applied to State v. Fulmer which relied whol-
ly upon State v. Roth to find that the phrase "sexually immoral act" had
"an accepted meaning that is not susceptible to misunderstanding. '57
Since State v. Roth has apparently not survived the development of the
obscenity laws, the basis of the court's decision in State v. Fulmer has
clearly been undermined.58
A probable outgrowth of declaring "immoral sexual purpose" un-
constitutionally vague will be an attack on the validity of the statute
prohibiting contributing to the delinquency of juveniles, which forbids
the "intentional enticing, aiding, or permitting, by anyone over the age
of seventeen, of any child under the age of seventeen . . . to: . . . (7)
Perform any sexually immoral act. . . -59 The court's attempt to avert
this foreseeable problem in De/rances does not withstand close scrutiny.
In dictum the court said that "sexually immoral act" is not "unconstitu-
tionally vague today, for it can be read to mean that all sexual acts per-
formed with a child under seventeen are criminal."'60 Apparently the
court reasoned that any sexual act with ajuvenile would be a "sexually
complexes; (2) owners of places where sparsely-clad 'go go dancers' perform; (3) apart-
ment building owners who rent to unmarried couples who cohabit; (4) owners of bars
and lounges that provide comfortable surroundings to accommodate patrons 'making
out'; (5) owners of bars and lounges where customers engage in the current dance




54. State v. Roth, 226 La. 1, 74 So. 2d 392 (1954). See text at note 43, supra.
55. State v. Fulmer, 250 La. 29, 193 So. 2d 774 (1967). See text at note 43, supra.
56. 351 So. 2d at 137.
57. State v. Fulmer, 250 La. 29, 30, 193 So. 2d 774, 775 (1967).
58. See State v..Defrances, 351 So. 2d 133, 137 (La. 1977).
59. LA. R.S. 14:92 (1950), as amended by 1962 La. Acts, No. 394, § I (emphasis added).
60. 351 So. 2d at 137. See note 44, supra, for the definition of "sexual" that the court
obtained from WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. unabridged 1953).
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immoral act." However, earlier in its opinion the court resorted to an
extremely broad definition of "sexual" from WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY, and the use of this definition to clarify the juvenile
statute would lend itself to the kind of arbitrary and capricious enforce-
ment which Defrances sought to prevent. The court appears to have
ignored its earlier fear that broad language might encompass activity not
generally considered criminal.
The elimination of the phrase "sexually immoral act" from Louisi-
ana's statute punishing those who contribute to the delinquency of
juveniles would leave a gap in the law which attempts to curb juvenile
delinquency by suppressing sexual activity with juveniles. This gap
would be partially closed by the obscenity statute, which prohibits the
"solicitation or enticement of an unmarried person under the age of sev-
enteen years to commit any act" of obscenity,6 ' but acts of obscenity are
public acts. Therefore, to prohibit "enticing, aiding or permitting" a ju-
venile to perform a private "sexually immoral act," the legislature should
enact a specific statute relating to conduct with juveniles similar to its
description of "hard core sexual conduct" in the obscenity statute. 62
However, to deal more precisely with the area of private sexual activities
of juveniles, the definition of "hard core sexual conduct" should be mod-
ified to prohibit only actual conduct and to eliminate the requirement of
"public portrayal, for its own sake, and for ensuing commercial gain."'63
The effect of eliminating the phrase "immoral sexual purpose" from
Louisiana's keeping a disorderly place statute is presently unclear. It
61. LA. R.S. 14:106(A)(5) (1950), as amended by 1974 La. Acts, No. 274, § 1.
62. LA. R.S. 14:106(A)(2) (1950), as amended by 1974 La. Acts, No. 274, § 1, provides:
Hard core sexual conduct is the public portrayal, for its own sake, and for ensuing
commercial gain of:
(1) Ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual, simulated or animated,
whether between human beings, animals or an animal and a human being; or
(2) Masturbation, excretory functions or lewd exhibition, actual, simulated or
animated, of the genitals, pubic hair, anus, vulva or female breast nipples; or
(3) Sadomasochistic abuse, meaning actual, simulated or animated, flagellation or
torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in a costume which reveals the pubic
hair, anus, vulva, genitals or female breast nipples, or the condition of being fettered,
bound or otherwise physically restrained, on the part of one so clothed; or
(4) Actual, simulated or animated, touching, caressing or fondling of, or other simi-
lar physical contact with, a pubic area, anus, female breast nipple, covered or exposed,
whether alone or between humans, animals or a human and an animal, of the same or
opposite sex, in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification; or
(5) Actual, simulated or animated stimulation of a human genital organ by any de-





appears that the statutes remaining in force after Defrances64 will con-
tinue to serve the purpose originally intended by the legislature,65 as re-
vealed in the source provision of the present articles on keeping a
disorderly place, Act 199 of 1912.
A "disorderly house" was defined in the 1912 act as any establish-
ment which would "disturb the public peace and quiet of the neighbor-
hood," or "where lewd dancing is permitted," or "where lewd pictures
are accessible to view," or which was "used for the purposes of prostitu-
tion or assignation. '66 All four of these activities are currently prohib-
ited by other statutes-the first three by Criminal Code article 281
(prohibiting the maintaining of a disorderly place)67 and the last in arti-
cle 282 (prohibiting the operation of places of prostitution).68 The re-
maining phrase of the statute struck down in Defrances prohibits "the
intentional maintaining of a place to be used habitually for any illegal
purpose." Therefore, the elimination of the phrase "immoral sexual pur-
pose" caused no change in the overall scheme of the law as it was in-
tended to operate.
Although the remaining statutes dealing with keeping a disorderly
place include all the prohibitions apparently intended by the legislature,
consolidation and revamping of the law is needed to avoid the inevitable
future litigation which will arise because of the many vague and out-
dated terms contained in these statutes. To be effective, such legislative
reform should retain all the elements of the present law while clarifying
64. LA. R.S. 14:281, 281, 282 (1950) and LA. R.S. 14:104 (1950) (excluding the phrase
"immoral sexual purpose").
65. See State v. Defrances, 351 So. 2d 133, 136 (La. 1977) ("to control the proliferation
of bawdy houses").
66. La. Acts 1912, No. 199.
67. LA. R.S. 14:281 (1950) provides in part:
No person shall maintain a place of public entertainment or a public resort or any
place, room, or part of a building open to the public in such a manner as to disturb the
public peace and quiet of the neighborhood, or in which lewd dancing is permitted, or
in which lewd pictures are accessible to view.
Both 104 and 281 seek to prohibit the keeping of a disorderly place. The two differ in that
article 104 establishes a more extensive prohibition and provides a stiffer penalty for its
violation.
68. LA. R.S. 14:282 (1950) provides in part:
No person shall maintain, operate, or knowingly own any place or any conveyance
used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, or shall rent or let any
place or conveyance to any person with knowledge of or good reason to believe that
the lessee intends to use the place or conveyance for the purpose of lewdness, assigna-
tion, or prostitution. No person shall engage in lewdness, assignation, or prostitution,




terms and consolidating definitions. It is suggested that the repeal of
Criminal Code articles 104, 281 and 282 and substitution of the follow-
ing proposed statute would accomplish this goal.
Keeping a disorderly place
Keeping a disorderly place is the intentional maintaining or operat-
ing of a place to be used habitually for the purposes of prostitution,
assignation, or any illegal purpose. Keeping a disorderly place also
includes the intentional maintaining or operating of any place open
to the public where obscene pictures are accessible to view, where
obscene dancing is permitted, or which disturbs the peace.
The first sentence of the proposed statute combines the prohibitions
contained in Criminal Code articles 104 and 282. The proscription of
the "intentional maintaining or operating of a place to be used for the
purposes of prostitution [or] assignation" in the proposed statute con-
tains the essence of the article 282 prohibition and it has a well known
and commonly understood meaning. The statutory definition of "pros-
titution" is precise69 and "assignation" has acquired a clear definition in
the jurisprudence.70 Omitted from the proposed statute was the using of
a place for the "purpose of lewdness" in article 282 which is questionable
at best since "any act of lewdness" has been declared unconstitutionally
vague.71
The provision of article 282 forbidding a person to "reside in, enter,
or remain in any place for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or pros-
titution" was omitted from the proposed statute because it lacked a suffi-
cient relationship to the type of conduct that the keeping of a disorderly
place statute encompasses. 72 This conduct has a much closer connection
to the prohibitions contained in the statutes prohibiting prostitution, so-
licitation, and vagrancy. The present vagrancy statute declares "persons
who live in houses of ill fame or who habitually associate with prosti-
tutes"'73 guilty of vagrancy. This statute could be expanded to include a
69. LA. R.S. 14:82 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 49:
Prostitution is:
(a) The practice by a person of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with others for
compensation.
(b) The solicitation by one person of another with the intent to engage in indiscrimi-
nate sexual intercourse with the latter for compensation.
70. Assignation is not defined in the criminal statutes but has acquired meaning
through judicial interpretation as "solicitation for prostitution and for crimes against na-
ture." Garrison v. Menendez, 158 So. 2d 856, 859-60 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
71. State v. Christine, 239 La. 259, 118 So. 2d 403 (1959).
72. Keeping a disorderly place refers to maintaining or operating a place as opposed to
residing in, entering, or remaining in a place.
73. LA. R.S. 14:107(2) (1950) provides:
1978]
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prohibition of entering or remaining in any place for the purpose of
prostitution or assignation. The remaining language of article 282 was
excluded because it was either repetitious or covered by article 105 (let-
ting a disorderly place). 74 "Any illegal purpose," from article 104, which
was included verbatim in the proposed statute, has the obvious meaning
of "contrary to or prohibited by some criminal statute."'75
The recommended statute's second sentence is derived from Crimi-
nal Code article 281 which also prohibits maintaining a disorderly place.
"Obscene pictures" is substituted for the suspect "lewd pictures," 76
thereby incorporating the guidelines for "obscene material" contained in
Louisiana's obscenity statute77 which were derived from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Miller v. Caifornia.78 "Disturbing the peace" is in-
cluded in the proposed statute virtually unchanged from the present law
("disturb the public peace and quiet of the neighborhood") except for the
elimination of useless words.79
Language in Defrances indicates that the term "lewd dancing" in
article 281, which withstood a vagueness challenge in 1920,80 may not
survive present scrutiny. Changing sexual mores and their effect on the
manner of dancing would be the determining factor in a modern consid-
"The following persons are and shall be guilty of vagrancy:
(2) Persons who live in houses of ill fame or who habitually associate with prosti-
tutes .... "
74. LA. R.S. 14:105 (1950) provides in part:
"Letting a disorderly place is the granting of the right to use any premises knowing
that they are to be used as a disorderly place, or allowing the continued use of the
premises with such knowledge."
75. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 182, 29 So. 2d 758, 762 (1947). Accord, State v.
Defrances, 351 So. 2d 133 (La. 1977); State v. Bulot, 175 La. 21, 142 So. 787 (1932); State v.
Holland, 120 La. 429, 45 So. 380 (1907).
76. Any prohibition of "lewd pictures" that does not encompass the guidelines for ob-
scene material promulgated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), may not meet
the requirements of the first amendment.
77. LA. R.S. 14:106 (1950), as amended by 1974 La. Acts, No. 274, § 1. See especially
section 106(A)(3) defining "obscene material":
[A]ny tangible work or thing which the trier of fact determines (a) that the average
person applying contemporary community standards would find, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; and (b) depicts or describes in a patently offensive
way, hard core sexual conduct specifically defined in Paragraph (2) above; and (c) the
work or thing as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
See note 62, supra, for the explicit definition of hard core sexual conduct.
78. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
79. The language prohibiting "disturbing the peace" in LA. R.S. 14:103 (1950), as
amended by 1969 La. Acts, No. 93, withstood a vagueness challenge in State v. Heck, 307
So. 2d 332 (La. 1975).
80. State v. Rose, 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643 (1920).
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eration of the sufficiency of the term "lewd dancing."'' s To illustrate the
possible abuse of enforcement powers, the court in Defrances alluded to
the chance that "current dance crazes, such as 'the bump' which is sug-
gestive of sexual intercourse,"82 could be considered criminal conduct.
To avoid such an absurd result, "obscene dancing" has been substituted
to embody the sanctioned guidelines in Louisiana's obscenity statute. 83
The restriction of "open to the public" is consistent with the present law
contained in article 281.
The adoption of the proposed statute would render unnecessary the
part of the pandering statute which prohibits "the intentional. . . main-
taining [of] a place where prostitution is habitually practiced."' 84 Louisi-
ana's letting a disorderly place statute85 utilizes the definition of
disorderly place found in the keeping a disorderly place statute. The
proposed statute provides this definition with specific prohibitions in-
cluding "a place to be used habitually for the purpose of prostitution."
Thus the letting statute would render Criminal Code article 85 (letting
premises for prostitution)86 superfluous. Therefore, it is suggested that
articles 84(2) and 85 should be repealed.
The holding of State v. Defrances furnishes Louisiana's "void for
vagueness" doctrine with more than a determination that the phrase
"immoral sexual purpose" is invalid. After Defrances, a Louisiana
court should expand its scrutiny to consider the effect of changing times
in deciding whether words have a well known or commonly understood
meaning. When changing times blur once clear distinctions, Defrances
indicates that courts will take cognizance of these uncertainties to guar-
81. 351 So. 2d at 135-36.
82. Id. at 136.
83. LA. R.S. 14:106(A)(2) (1950), as amended by 1974 La. Acts, No. 274, § 1, prohibits,
inter alia,
[p]articipation or engagement in, or ... performance ... of, hard core sexual con-
duct when the trier of fact determines that the average person applying contemporary
community standards would find that the conduct, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; and the hard core sexual conduct, as specifically defined herein, is
presented in a patently offensive way; and the conduct taken as a whole lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
See note 62, supra, for the explicit definition of hard core sexual conduct.
84. LA. R.S. 14:84(2) (1950).
85. LA. R.S. 14:105. See note 74, supra, for the text of this section.
86. LA. R.S. 14:85 (1950) provides in part:
Letting premises for prostitution is the granting of the right of use or the leasing of any
premises, knowing that they are to be used for the practice of prostitution, or allowing
the continued use of the premises with such knowledge.
1978]
1128 LOUISIA4NA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
antee individuals their "right to know what is prohibited." 87
Matthew Anthony Welman
87. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
